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I. INTRODUCTION
The scenario occurs daily in many different businesses. A
disgruntled employee decides to use her talents, skills, and knowledge
of the industry to start a rival enterprise. She plans to do things
differently-offer lower prices, a different sales approach, a more
service-oriented style. To minimize the risk involved, the employee
decides to investigate potential markets, possible locations for the
business, and financing. She would also like to discuss first-hand
with current clients or fellow employees the possibility that they
would follow her into the new business. Concerned with breaching
fiduciary obligations, the employee contacts her attorney and asks for
advice-specifically, what steps may she take while still employed?
The above hypothetical currently perplexes corporate attorneys
because of uncertainty in the law on this matter. The law is clear
that absent a covenant-not-to-compete, a high-level employee may
resign and set up a new company directly competing with the former
employer.' In so doing, the employee may use the skills and knowl-
edge acquired from the employer, and the employee may solicit the
employer's customers and employees.2 Promotion of free competition
and entrepreneurial behavior justifies the rule; the right to start a
new business based on an innovative idea, product, or approach is
integral to our capitalist system.8 As studies have shown, small- and
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, after
the termination of the agency, the agent.. has no duty not to compete with the
principal .... "); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
5.06 cmt. f (1994) [hereinafter PRNCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE] (stating that in the
absence of a covenant, a senior executive is free to compete after resigning).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 cmt.b (1958) ("[AlIthough an agent
cannot properly subsequently use copies of written memoranda concerning customers... he is
normally privileged to use, in competition with the principal, the names of customers retained
in his memory as the result of his work for the principal and also methods of doing business and
processes which are but skillful variations of general processes known to the particular trade.").
3. See Pat M. Chew, Competing Interests in the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 67 N.C.
L. REV. 435, 452 (1989) [hereinafter Competing Interests] (arguing that the corporate
opportunity doctrine, which limits the competitive actions an employee can take against her
employer, will actually decrease the number of opportunities exploited).
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medium-size firms have employed the most people over the last two
decades, serving as the largest source of economic growth.4
Most businesspeople, however, plan carefully before starting a
new enterprise. Before beginning operations, the entrepreneur con-
siders financing, location, the product, customers, and other items.5
Only through careful consideration of these factors can the entrepre-
neur make an informed decision about the new venture's likelihood
for success.6 For the employee desiring to form her new business
within the same industry that she currently works, such planning
creates tensions with opposing policy interests-the duty of loyalty
protecting the company from employee self-interest 7 and free
competition requiring that the employee have some freedom to make
necessary preparations to compete.
Courts apply the "preliminary steps doctrine" in an attempt to
resolve the tension. The doctrine allows an employee to pursue in-
vestment, seek legal advice, research the market, and take other
4. See DAvED L. BIRCH, JoB CREATION IN AME1_CA How OUR SMALLEST COMPANIES PuT
THE MOST PEOPLE TO WoRK 6-16 (1987) (arguing that small firms provide the most innovation
and that most American workers are employed by small enterprises).
5. Numerous books and articles support this point. Many of these sources indicate the
importance of direct customer contact in researching the market. See generally SCOTT A.
CLARK, BEATING THE ODDS: 10 SMART STEPS TO SMALL-BusINESS SUCCESS 38-44 (1991)
(explaining that in-person interviews with potential key customers are the best method for
testing product ideas); Ernest R. Cadotte & Robert B. Woodruff, Analyzing Market Opportunities
for New Ventures, in MARKETING AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: RESEARCH IDEAS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 115-29 (Gerald E. Hills ed., 1994) (suggesting that a market opportunity
analysis-a general study of the industry typically conducted before starting a new
enterprise-should include customer and competition profiles, with customer profiles detailing
customer needs and wants, activities, opinions and attitudes, purchase procedures, and
satisfaction with past purchases, among other items); Antonio S. Lauglaug, Technical-Market
Research-Get Customers to Collaborate in Deueloping New Products, in MARKETING
STRATEGIES: NEW APPROACHES, NEW TECHNIQUES 23-25 (Malcolm McDonald ed., 1995)
[hereinafter MARKETING STRATEGIES] (showing that companies frequently collaborate closely
with customers in developing new products through an approach that allows customers to "see
[the product] and experience it" before it is developed to determine if a need for the product
actually exists).
6. See generally Robert G. Cooper & Elko J. Kleinschmidt, Screening New Products for
Potential Winners, in MARKETING STRATEGIES, supra note 5, at 2-6 (explaining that the key to
the success of new products, besides being unique or superior, is extensive pre-development
homework including a detailed market study and constant customer contact and input).
7. Loyalty is currently a significant problem for businesses. Occupational fraud and
abuse cost United States businesses more than four billion dollars annually, with the "average
organization los[ing] about 6 percent of its total annual revenue to fraud and abuse committed
by its own employees." Harvey Gelb, Employee Disloyalty, Costs and Remedies, 32 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 891, 893 (1997) (analyzing statistical data from National Report of Certified
Fraud Examiners). Asset misappropriation accounts for more than 80 percent of employee
fraud offenses covered in the report. See id. Bribery and corruption, including conflict of
interest transactions, account for about 10 percent. See id. Thus, problems associated with
breaches of loyalty cost businesses millions of dollars each year, with most of the damages
caused by high-level officers, owners, and executives. See id. at 894.
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reasonable preparatory steps before resigning from employment.8 The
employee, however, may not actually compete with the employer prior
to resignation.9
The preliminary steps doctrine, however, has failed to be a
workable standard. Courts struggle to explain which preliminary
activities are competitive. The lines drawn between what constitutes
mere preparation and actual competition have been arbitrary, often
based on differing conceptions of competition. 10 The vague line has
prevented attorneys from providing adequate counsel. Attorneys
typically advise employees to resign before taking any action, or to
proceed carefully and cautiously, "keeping in mind that there are
many gray areas where a reasonable fact-finder could find in favor of
either party.""
In efforts to end the confusion, one commentator has argued to
eliminate the doctrine altogether,12 and at least one jurisdiction has
done so.'3 Other jurisdictions purport to apply the same preliminary
steps standard but reach inconsistent results on whether pre-termi-
nation negotiations with the employer's customers or employees rise
8. See, e.g., Harllee & Atec Assocs. v. Professional Serv. Indus., 619 So. 2d 298, 300 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that an employee can essentially form her own business and outfit
it while still employed so long as she does not commence business prior to resigning); Adams v.
Lockformer Co., 520 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (I1. App. Ct. 1988) ("[Elven though an employee of
Lockformer, Adams could go so far as form a rival corporation and outfit it for business as long
as he did not commence business while still employed."); Lawter Intl, Inc. v. Carroll, 451 N.E.2d
1338, 1349 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (defining preliminary activities to include obtaining financing,
designing a production plant, and purchasing equipment and supplies); Meyers v. Roger J.
Sullivan Co., 131 N.W. 521, 522 (Mich. 1911) (allowing departing employee to organize business
and make plans for a new store).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 (1958).
10. See Cudahy Co. v. American Lab., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (D. Neb. 1970) (stating
that "[blecause of the competing interests the actionable wrong is a matter of degree"); Bancroft-
Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 935 (Cal. 1966) ("No ironclad rules as to the type of conduct
which is permissible can be stated, since the spectrum of activities in this regard is as broad as
the ingenuity of man itself.").
11. David J. Gass, Departing Directors, Officers and Employees and the Limits of Their
Fiduciary Duties, 72 MICH. B.J. 650, 654 (1993) (pointing out that there are few Michigan cases
showing where the line between preparation and competition is drawn and suggesting that
cases in other jurisdictions offer only broad principles).
12. See William Lynch Schaller, Disloyalty and Distrust: The Eroding Fiduciary Duties of
Illinois Employees, 3 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1, 73-75 (1990-91) (labeling the preliminary steps
doctrine a "siren's song" for employee disloyalty and concluding that eliminating the
preliminary steps doctrine "would simply require employees to suffer the same risks and costs
other persons face in starting a business, thereby preventing employees from obtaining an
unfair headstart").
13. See Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky. 1991) (holding
that directors and officers should terminate their position when they first make arrangements
or begin preparations to compete).
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to the level of wrongful competitive behavior. 4 While the various
results are explainable in part by the heavy factual inquiry involved,
this Note shows that very similar cases lead to conflicting judgments.
This Note advocates an approach that considers the expectations of
the parties to the employment relationship. In particular, it contends
that a relaxed duty of loyalty should be required of an at-will
employee, because the right to make extensive preparations is im-
plicit within an employment relationship that can be terminated at
any time with or without cause. This relaxed duty of loyalty should
allow at-will employees the right to contact customers and clients
before ending the employment relationship-an approach that cor-
responds with current employee and employer expectations in the
business world. A different duty of loyalty, however, should be ex-
pected of a fixed-term employee. The security of a fixed-term rela-
tionship justifies the imposition of stricter loyalty requirements that
forbid all pre-termination contact. Corporate law duty of loyalty
principles such as the corporate opportunity doctrine support this
approach. As this Note explains, distinguishing between fixed-term
and at-will employees will allow courts to consider the reasonable
expectations of the parties and the corporate and individual interests
at issue.
Part II of the Note explains that the preliminary steps doctrine
developed to balance the policy interests of fairness to the company
and free competition. Part III presents the difficulties in distinguish-
ing mere preparation from actual competition and suggests that the
contradictory results by courts stem from the application of a narrow
standard. Part IV contends that the current standard fails to protect
the corporate and individual interests at stake. Part V concludes by
presenting a framework that considers the employment relationship.
This Part suggests that courts should relax the loyalty required of at-
will employees.
14. The following states have expressly accepted the preliminary steps standard:
California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See generally ABA
SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, EMPLOYEE DUTY OF LOYALTY: A STATE-BY-STATE
SURVEY (Stewart S. Manela & Arnold H. Pedowitz eds., 1995) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE DUTY OF
LOYALTY].
1999] 205
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRELIMINARY STEPS DOCTRINE
A. Overview of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty demands that the fiduciary place corporate
interest above self-interest. Based on a recognition of human charac-
teristics and motivations, the duty of loyalty attempts to prevent the
exploitation of the corporation for personal gain.15 Courts most often
find a breach of the duty of loyalty when fiduciaries stand on both
sides of a transaction,16 appropriate a corporate opportunity,17 or form
an enterprise that directly competes with their employer.' s By enforc-
ing rules requiring the utmost fidelity from high-level employees, the
15. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (noting that the duty of loyalty at-
tempts to deter fiduciaries from betraying the corporation by demanding the most "scrupulous
observance" of fiduciary obligations to protect the company).
16. Corporate law considers this a conflict-of-interest transaction. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 144(a) (1997); see, e.g., State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d
979, 984 (Wash. 1964) (holding that the fiduciary obligation of undivided loyalty is not
automatically breached if the fiduciary has an interest in the transaction, but the fiduciary must
show fairness to the company and that full disclosure has occurred).
17. Courts use various tests to determine if the opportunity appropriated belonged to the
corporation. The line-of-business test is probably the most common. Under this approach, an
opportunity is a corporate opportunity if closely related to the corporation's existing or
prospective activities. Courts usually consider several factors in determining whether the
opportunity is within the line of business: the existence of a contractual right; the relationship
of the opportunity to the corporation's business and current activities; and whether the oppor-
tunity is essential, necessary, or merely desirable. There is a good deal of overlap and confusion
among courts over the difference between the line-of-business test and the duty not to compete.
See, e.g., Guth, 5 A.2d at 510-11; Ellzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1328, 1333 (Miss. 1979);
Jodi L. Popofsky, Note, Corporate Opportunity and Corporate Competition: A Double-Barreled
Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1193, 1216-25 (1982) (discussing cases where
courts impose liability for competition).
Some jurisdictions, however, adopt a more narrow interest or expectancy test. These states
differ on whether a narrow or broad definition of expectancy is used. Compare United Seal &
Rubber Co. v. Bunting, 285 S.E.2d 721, 722-23 (Ga. 1982) (defining interest or expectancy as a
contractual right to the opportunity), with Comedy Cottage, Inc. v. Berk, 495 N.E.2d 1006, 1011
(Il. App. Ct. 1986) (providing a broader view of interest and expectancy). Other jurisdictions
use a fairness test that asks whether the fiduciary violated some legal or moral duty to the
company in taking the opportunity. See Daloisio v. Peninsula Land Co., 43 N.J. Super. 79, 93
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1956). Still others combine two different approaches. See, e.g., Miller
v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 81 (Minn. 1974) (combining the line-of-business and fairness test into
a two-step balancing test).
18. What behavior constitutes competition under the corporate competition doctrine is not
entirely clear, as the preliminary steps cases demonstrate. Delaware law provides a starting
point for many courts. Under Delaware law, a corporate officer or director may engage in a
competitive enterprise, even if adversely affecting the principal, so long as the fiduciary violates
no legal or moral duty to the corporation. While the meaning of legal or moral duty is unclear,
most courts tend to supplement this general standard with specific prohibitions against unfair
exploitation. See Popofsky, supra note 17, at 1216-25 (discussing liability for competition).
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corporation is relieved of the nearly impossible task of monitoring
employee behavior. 9
At one time, only officers and directors with access to confiden-
tial information were considered fiduciaries. Changes in the economy
and workplace, however, have significantly increased those subject to
fiduciary duties.20 Currently courts consider fiduciaries to be anyone
with significant corporate trust or responsibility. Individuals com-
monly considered fiduciaries are officers and directors (including the
president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer), as well as employ-
ees with access to confidential information and with significant
authority.21 Moreover, under agency law, all employees are consid-
ered agents who owe a duty of loyalty to act entirely for the employer
in all matters relating to the employment relationship.2 2 Thus, the
obligations of loyalty under agency and corporate law extend to
employees in non-traditional fiduciary positions. Evidence indicates
that many of these employees do not realize the restraints on
economic mobility that come with their employment status.2 While
arguably a less stringent standard of loyalty should apply to these
lower-level employees, courts have yet to explain the relevance of
employee status in loyalty disputes.2
19. See Competing Interests, supra note 3, at 442.
20. See id. at 450-51.
21. See PAT K CHEW, DIREcTORS' AND OFFIcERS' LIABILITY 94-95 (1995) (hereinafter
DmECTORSl.
22. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958) defines an agent as anyone who
has manifested consent to act in a fiduciary relation on behalf of another and subject to his
control. Comment d to section 2.2 indicates that a servant is an agent, and under most statutes,
"servant"7 translates as an employee. For instance, section 220.1 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY defines servant as "a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another
and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the
other's control or right to control."
23. Corporate law in some ways distinguishes between the ordinary employee and the
traditional fiduciary by imposing the corporate opportunity doctrine only on high-level
employees with access to confidential information. Still, the lines between fiduciary and non-
fiduciary are blurred, and under agency law all employees are subject to a duty not to compete
with the employer until the agency is terminated. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393
cmt. e (1958).
24. Some cases can be read to suggest that at-will employees are subject to a more lenient
standard. See, e.g., Headquarters Buick-Nissan, Inc. v. Michael Oldsmobile, 539 N.Y.S.2d 355,
356 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (stating that under certain conditions an at-will employee may be
free to establish a business in competition with his employer while still employed). One
commentator, however, has suggested that employment status will not make much difference in
preliminary steps cases as a practical matter. Only officers, directors, and key employees are
involved in these disputes because they have the talents and contacts to attract future custom-
ers. Thus, they are the only ones whose disloyalty will actually harm the employer. See
Schaller, supra note 12, at 72-73.
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B. Balancing Fairness to the Company and Free Competition
Despite the duty of loyalty's requirement of self-denying
behavior, common law has long recognized an employee's right to plan
for future work. The practical need to protect oneself from the
possibility of a layoffs and the belief in fundamental notions of indi-
vidual liberty and free competition 6 provided the impetus for a rule
that allowed an employee to make certain preparations to start a
competitive enterprise while still employed. The Restatement of
Agency codified the preliminary steps doctrine in Comment e to
Section 393. Almost all jurisdictions accepting the doctrine follow the
Restatement's formulation.27
Comment e states that an employee can make preliminary
arrangements to compete with her employer, so long as the employee
does not use confidential information pertaining to the employer's
business.2 Preliminary arrangements include the purchase of a rival
business and presumably any step necessary to purchase or establish
the rival business.29 The duty of loyalty prohibits the agent from
actually competing with the employer, however, until after
termination of the agency. 0 The Restatement, however, fails to define
solicitation or provide guidance on what behavior would be deemed
competitive.
Restrictions on the departing agent's conduct towards fellow
employees also are not well defined. While the Restatement prohibits
an agent from enticing fellow employees to breach contracts with em-
ployers or from convincing fellow employees to leave simultaneously,
some liberty for agents to agree among themselves to start a new
venture is allowed.31
25. See Meyers v. Roger J. Sullivan Co., 131 N.W. 521, 522-23 (Mich. 1911) ("One is enti-
tled to seek other employment before he is on the street.").
26. One court explained that employees owe a "duty to give loyal and conscientious service
while [employer] employed them," but the employee's "individual liberty includes the right to
advise customers of the fact that he is going to quit, and that thereafter he will be working for a
competitor." Baker v. Battershell, Madison Equity No.5, 1986 WL 7602, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1986).
27. For states recognizing the preliminary steps doctrine, see EMPLOYEE DUTY OF
LOYALTY, supra note 14. Kentucky is the only state that appears to forbid any preliminary
arrangements. See id. at 260; Steelvest Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky.
1991) (holding that directors and officers should first terminate their positions before making
arrangements or preparing to compete). Scansteel is slightly ambiguous, however, with some
language in the decision suggesting that preparation is allowed.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 cmt.e (1958).
29. See id.




In providing an exception to the duty of loyalty, the prelimi-
nary steps doctrine embodied in the Restatement caused a tension to
emerge between the competing policies of fairness to the corporation
and the individual interest in economic mobility. Maryland Metals
Inc. v. Metzner recognized and first explained these conflicting poli-
cies. 2 In Maryland Metals, the vice-president of a scrap metal busi-
ness discovered a new machine that he found to be more efficient than
other equipment at separating metal from non-metal. He made
several recommendations to the board of directors to acquire the
machine, but all were deferred for various reasons. 3 After failing to
persuade the president to provide him with equity in the company,
the defendant made preparations prior to resignation, including the
formation of a new company that would use the machine.3 The
employer brought an action for breach of fiduciary obligations on
grounds that the defendant failed to disclose these competitive plans.
In finding no liability, the court recognized the importance of
the duty of loyalty in protecting the company from unfairness and
commercial immorality in the business world. It acknowledged that
obligations of loyalty were necessary to protect the employer from
abuse and exploitation by high-level employees.35 Nevertheless, the
court explained that the duty of loyalty must be balanced with the
policy favoring the promotion of free competition and the considera-
tion of individual interests such as economic mobility. Because of
these policy considerations, the court held that preparation should be
allowed, even though the employee's competition may eventually
harm the employer.6 The court explained that liability would be
found only if the preparation was in bad faith.3
7
32. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (Md. 1978). Prior to the
Maryland Metals decision, some courts required fifll disclosure of the employee's preparations.
See, e.g., C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 183 A.2d 374, 379-80 (Md. 1962).
33. See Maryland Metals, 382 A.2d at 566.
34. See ida at 567.
35. See id. at 568.
36. See id. at 569.
37. By bad faith the court meant some "fraudulent, unfair or wrongful act" such as the
misappropriation of trade secrets, the misuse of confidential information, the usurpation of an
employer's business opportunity, or a conspiracy to bring about mass resignation of the
employer's key employees. In this case, appellants produced no evidence of fraudulent or
wrongful conduct. At trial the evidence revealed that defendant had continued to put forth his
best efforts for the employer until the end of his employement. See id. at 569-72.
1999] 209
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III. THE UNCERTAINTY IN THE PRELIMINARY STEPS DocTRNE
Although the court in Maryland Metals concisely explained the
competing policies at issue, it failed to provide practical guidance in
balancing these interests.3 8 Since Maryland Metals, courts attempt-
ing to balance the competing policy interests have produced contradic-
tory results from similar fact patterns.39 In particular, courts have
been unable to determine when an employee's actions in notifying
employees or customers of her plans goes beyond mere preparation.40
The inconsistent decisions stem in part from the differing conceptions
of competitive behavior among the courts. Some courts narrowly
interpret competition to mean receiving guarantees of future
contracts, while others apply a broader interpretation, viewing almost
all notification as solicitation.
A. Jurisdictions Inconsistently Determine Whether Client
Contact Violates the Duty Not to Compete
1. Some Courts Adopt a Lenient Approach to Preparation
Determining a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in pre-
liminary steps disputes requires a close analysis of the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case, with particular attention on the nature of
the preparations. 41 Under this standard, however, some courts sug-
gest preparation includes actions by employees that are inherently
competitive with their employer. In Dwyer, Costello & Knox, P.C. v.
Diak, for example, the defendant, an officer of the plaintiffs
accounting firm, informed his employer of his plans to leave, but
agreed to stay a few months to complete work in progress.42 During
this period, the defendant sent letters to his employer's clients,
38. Maryland Metals presented a series of factors that courts should look at to determine
bad faith. These factors included soliciting clients and employees, stealing trade secrets or
confidential information, and usurping a corporate opportunity. See id.
39. This unpredictability caused attorneys to struggle in representing clients on these
matters. See Gass, supra note 11, at 654 (stating that the outcome of litigation involving
departed employees is difficult to predict); Schaller, supra note 12, at 4 (blaming legal confusion
in part for the extensive amount of litigation).
40. As one judge stated, "[t]here would appear to be no precise line between acts by an
employee which constitute mere preparation and those which amount to solicitation." C-E-I-R,
Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 183 A.2d 374, 379 (Md. 1962).
41. See Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 935 (Cal. 1966) (stating that the mere
fact that an employee makes preliminary steps to compete is not sufficient to find a breach of
fiduciary duty).
42. Dwyer, Costello & Knox, P.C. v. Diak, 846 S.W.2d 742,744-45 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
216 [Vol. 52:201
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informing them of his new partnership and indicating his willingness
to provide them future services. 3 Several of the employer's clients
transferred their business to the defendant's new partnership.44
Because the defendant did not seek business opportunities for his
competitive enterprise prior to informing his employer of his
departure, the court found the activity proper.45
Other decisions provide a similarly lenient interpretation of
mere preparation, finding no breach of the duty of loyalty if the
preparation fails to guarantee future work. The employee's contact
with clients, therefore, may go beyond notification to include subtle
attempts to persuade customers to conduct business with the new
venture.46 In Ellis & Marshall Associates v. Marshall, the court found
that the defendant's preliminary discussions with clients constituted
"statements as to the defendant's future plans," and therefore did not
constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty.47 The defendant in
Marshall, a long-time owner and partner of the plaintiff, decided to
start his own enterprise when he and the plaintiff failed to reconcile
their differences.4 He approached clients of their partnership and
informed them that he wanted to represent them, also stating that he
could wait for an answer.49 He also informed several employees of his
intentions.5 The court considered these activities to be mere
arrangements to compete, because the plaintiff did not ask plaintiffs
43. Other facts in the case reveal the extent of the employee's actual competition with the
employer. At the time these letters were sent to the clients, the defendant had already rented
office space, moved files, and convinced other employees of the employer to join his new com-
pany. See id
44. See id.
45. The court reasoned that free competition and economic mobility-particularly
concerning at-will employees-in part justified the result. The employer could have protected
itself from the loss of maqjor clients if it had obtained a covenant-not-to-compete. See id. at 748.
Other cases directly contradict this result, holding that entering into transactions with potential
corporate customers while still working for the employer constitutes a breach of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty. See, e.g., E.J. McKernan Co. v. Gregory, 623 N.E.2d 981, 993-94 (I1. App. Ct.
1993) (holding that resignation will not sever liability for transactions completed after
resignation, if the transactions began during the existence of the relationship or were based on
information gained during the relationship).
46. See, e.g., In re Golden Distrib., Ltd. v. Auburn Merchandising Distributorship, Inc.,
134 B.R. 750, 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no violation of duty of loyalty when employees
notified customers of their departure to join new employer and implied that customers should
submit orders to the new employer).
47. Ellis & Marshall Assocs. v. Marshall, 306 N.E.2d 712,715-16(11. App. Ct. 1973).
48. Id at714.
49. See id. at 715. The plaintiff and defendant disagreed over when the defendant notified
the plaintiff of his intentions to resign. Under either's facts, however, some of the defendant's
notification and solicitation of clients occured before his disclosure.
50. The employees later joined the plaintiff. See id. at 714-15.
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clients to approve of the plan and did not attempt to persuade them to
employ him in his new capacity. 51
In McCallister Co. v. Kastella, a high-level employee provided a
thirty-day notice of her resignation, stating an intention to form a
competitive enterprise. 52 She also contacted clients through personal
letters which explained that she "appreciated [the client's] kindness
and support."53 The letter specifically denied that it was a solicitation
of the client's business.5 Nevertheless, four of the employer's six or
seven commercial clients called promptly after receiving the letter
and verbally informed the defendant that they would hire the new
enterprise. Several fellow employees also approached the defendant
about the possibility of work. She told them that they could join the
business once the company started operations.55 Six of nine employ-
ees joined the new business.56
The McCallister court required more direct evidence of persua-
sive pre-termination activity before it would find a breach of the duty
of loyalty.57 The letter to the clients and verbal confirmations prior to
the end of the employee's employment did not establish a breach. 58
Using language similar to that in Ellis & Marshall Associates, the
McCallister court indicated that the employer must show that the
departing employee actively sought guarantees of future work.
Accepting verbal confirmations over the phone did not constitute such
solicitation.59
2. Some Courts Find a Breach of the Duty of Loyalty
for Almost Any Pre-termination Client Contact
Some courts interpret competitive behavior more broadly.
These courts significantly limit the amount of preparation allowed,
suggesting that subtle attempts to "feel out" clients constitute disloyal
competition. In Veco Corp. v. Babcock, the employees' preliminary
arrangements included approaching several key employees of the
National Exchange Benefit Trust ("NEBT"), their employer's major
51. See id. at 716-17.
52. McCallister Co. v. Kastella, 825 P.2d 980, 981 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
53. Id. at 981.
54 See i,.
55. See id. at 983.
56. See id
57. Id. at 984-85; see also Jet Courier Serv. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 491-98 (Colo. 1986)
(providing another interesting example of the extensive amount of preparation that a court has
allowed).
58. See McCallister, 825 P.2d at 984-85.
59. See id at 984.
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client, to "see what their feelings were" as to whether they would be
willing to transfer work to a new enterprise. 6o They also made it
known that the client's employer would be losing all key personnel
who worked on and understood the client's accounts. A day after the
employees were fired and began full-time'at their competing business,
opened earlier in the month, several clients transferred their accounts
to the new company.61
In contrast to Ellis & Marshall Associates, the court in Veco
found that the defendant's pre-termination acts constituted
solicitation even though none of the clients had verbally or otherwise
guaranteed any business.62 The court found significant the number of
clients that transferred their business so quickly despite the typical
practice of carefully examining the insurance carrier.63  This
coincidence suggested to the court that pre-termination solicitation
must have occurred.6 Rather than looking for firm guarantees as a
sign of competitive behavior, the Veco court indicated a willingness to
infer competitive behavior from the surrounding evidence.
The court in Veco may have been more willing to infer solicita-
tion because evidence suggested that the defendants had deliberately
sought to steal NEBT's business from the employer.6 5 More impor-
tantly, however, the court was influenced by the defendants' positions
as corporate officers-traditional fiduciaries-rather than typical em-
ployees. The court explained that corporate fiduciaries stood on a
"different footing" from typical employees, and that the law governing
the right of former employees to compete was separate and distinct
60. Veco Corp. v. Babcock, 611 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (1. App. Ct. 1993).
61. See id
62. Compare id at 1059-60, with Ellis & Marshall Assocs. v. Marshall, 306 N.E.2d 712,
717 (IlM. App. Ct. 1973) ("The defendant here did not ask the plaintiff's clients to approve his
plan or even attempt at that time to persuade them to employ him in his new capacity.").
63. See Veco, 611 N.E.2d at 1060 (noting that shortly after defendant's departure from
Veco, six Veco group clients transferred their business).
64. See id The court was most likely influenced by other acts suggesting disloyal behav-
ior, including the employees' knowledge that their departure would leave the employer unable
to service NEBT, and specific evidence suggesting that the departing employees planned and
actively sought to steal the employer's business. Indeed, a "smoking gun" report existed detail-
ing how the departing employees planned to steal Veco Company's group accounts. See id. at
1056-61. Nevertheless, the holding suggests that even absent these actions, a breach of fiduci-
ary obligations would have existed because pre-termination solicitation must have occurred
based on the number of clients that transferred their business so quickly. See also Alexander &
Alexander Benefits Serv. Inc. v. Benefit Brokers & Consultants, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1408, 1412-13
(D. Or. 1991) (finding that employees breached fiduciary duty of loyalty because sending letters
notifying clients of the new business, its services, budget, and address constituted wrongful
solicitation).
65. Veco, 611 N.E.2d at 1059-60.
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from a breach of fiduciary duty by an officer. 66 Thus the court seemed
more willing to scrutinize the pre-termination behavior of fiduciaries
more closely than that of the typical employee.
Vigoro Industries, Inc. v. Cleveland Chemical Co. also con-
sidered the employment status of the defendant in determining
whether a breach of loyalty had occurred.67 The court was more
willing, however, to apply a strict view of the duty of loyalty despite
the defendant's status as an at-will employee. In this case, a highly
respected and talented supervisor became disgruntled with his
employer.68 He entered into a number of discussions with a competi-
tor over a period of several years and finally decided to operate a
facility for the competitor.69 In preparing to start the competitive
venture, the defendant informed fellow employees of his departure
and told them that there would be work for them at the new location
if the employees wanted to join him.70 He also sent a letter to custom-
ers after resigning but before termination. Although the letter was
addressed to "our valued customers," like the letter in McCallister, it
simply stated a wish to serve the customers' needs in the future.
7'1
The court found the letter crossed the line from mere notification into
solicitation, however, even though it included no price information
and did not lead to any guarantees of future work.
72
The Vigoro court stated a reluctance to place restrictions on at-
will employees that would prevent them from earning a living, espe-
cially in today's free-wheeling, high-turnover job environment.7 3 The
court did not consider the defendant's employment status in
determining whether a breach of loyalty had occurred. Instead, the
court simply applied the duty not to compete irrespective of employee
status, finding a breach of loyalty even though the pre-termination
activity could have been construed as either notification or
solicitation.74 The court's decision not to consider the employee's
66. Id. at 1059.
67. Vigoro Indus., Inc. v. Cleveland Chem. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1150, 1160 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
68. See id. at 1156-57. The employee believed that his employer was not providing
equipment necessary to meet the challenges of the competitive market. See id. at 1157.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 1158. Although many of the employees left with the defendant, the court did
not consider this a factor in finding a breach of the duty of loyalty, because it was convinced the
employees would have departed whether or not the defendant had solicited them. See id at
1169.
71. Id. at 1164.
72. See id. at 1165.
73. See id. at 1160.
74. See id. at 1165. Comparing the letters and actions of the employee in Vigoro with the
employer's actions in McCallister and Ellis & Marshall supports this point. See McCallister CO.
v. Kastella, 825 P.2d 980, 982 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), and Ellis & Marshall Associates v. Marshall,
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status comports with other decisions which have allowed at-will em-
ployees to make arrangements to compete as long as no solicitation
has occurred. These courts hold that solicitation violates the at-will
employee's duty of undivided loyalty75
3. The Cases are Factually Similar yet Yield Different Results
Since the preparations in Veco and Vigoro resembled those in
McCallister and Ellis & Marshall Associates, and both courts pur-
ported to apply the same standard, the courts should have reached
the same results. Like the defendants in McCallister and Ellis &
Marshall, the Veco defendant's preparation included investigating the
possibility that clients would transfer business to the new enter-
prise.7 6 Yet the courts reached different results on whether inquiries
into the clients' willingness to change employers constituted a breach
of the duty of loyalty. Moreover, there is little factual difference
between the letters sent by the defendants in McCallister and Vigoro.
Indeed, stating a wish to serve customers in the future and expressing
appreciation for the clients' support are both calculated attempts at
solicitation. The quick response by the clients in McCallister
underscores this point, perhaps suggesting that the defendant in that
case engaged in more competitive behavior than the defendant in
Vigoro. Other decisions support this point.77 Nevertheless, the court
found the defendant's actions in McCallister to constitute mere
preparation, while in Vigoro the court found similar behavior to
constitute actual competition.
306 N.E.2d 712, 714 (IlM. App. Ct. 1973), both of which suggest that solicitation occurs when
employees or customers guarantee that they will switch to the new venture.
75. See, eg., Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 208 A.2d 74,85 (Md. 1965) (finding
a duty of fidelity to the employer while employed); Eaves v. Hillard Co., Appeal No. 88-37-i1,
1988 WL 49959, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that an employee may not solicit his
employer's customers while still employed). Nevertheless, at least one jurisdiction has
suggested a public policy not to inhibit an at-will employee's decision to compete. See In re
Golden Distrib., Ltd. v. Auburn Merchandising Distributorship, Inc., 134 B.R. 750, 756 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1991). In a close case, equity suggests the court should err on the side of an at-will
employee. As this Note suggests, employer and employee expectations in an at-will relationship
indicate that both employees and employers expect preparation for future employment is
allowed.
76. Veco Corp. v. Babcock, 611 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (11. App. Ct. 1993).
77. See, e.g., Community Counselling Serv., Inc. v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239, 244 (4th Cir.
1963):
If prospective customers undertake the opening of negotiations which the employee
could not initiate, he must decline to participate in them. Above all, he should be candid
with his employer and should withhold no information which would be useful to the
employer in the protection and promotion of its interests.
1999] 215
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
4. Steelvest Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center Inc.
Steelvest Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center Inc. further illustrates
the limitations of the current preliminary steps doctrine. In Steelvest,
the defendant, a long-time figure in the Kentucky steel industry,
retained a high position in Steelvest after it bought out his em-
ployer.78 After several months with Steelvest, the defendant began
preparations to actively compete. He sought advice of counsel, con-
tacted potential investors, and obtained financing prior to resigning.
79
Two of the investors included long-time friends of the defendant and
high-ranking employees of Steelvest cients.8° Steelvest brought suit
claiming the defendant breached the duty of loyalty.81
The court found the evidence sufficient to conclude issues of
material fact existed on the question.82 In so doing, it promulgated a
rule that found all preliminary arrangements to be by definition a
breach of the duty of loyalty.8 The stringent rule-draconian com-
pared to other jurisdications-may have resulted from the court's
struggle to justify finding the pre-termination contact with investors a
breach of the duty of loyalty. Pre-termination contact with investors
is an essential step in preparing to compete-that is, entrepreneurs
must be able to obtain financing for their new enterprise before any
business activity can occur. From a broader duty of loyalty
perspective, however, pre-termination contact violates basic duty of
loyalty concepts that require the employee to consider the employer's
interests before her own. Steelvest can be viewed as yet another
demonstration of a court struggling to define competition and to find
the proper balance between the policy interests of fairness to the
company and the promotion of free competition.
B. Pre-termination Employee Contact Leads to Various
Results in Similar Fact Patterns
The application of the mere preparation doctrine to the solici-
tation of employees is also confusing. Some courts prohibit all at-
78. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., 807 S.W.2d 476,478-79 (Ky. 1991).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 479-80.
81. See id at 484.
82. See id.
83. In addressing the issue of whether the defendanfs preparations went too far, the court
explained that "directors and officers of a corporation may not set up, or attempt to set up, an
enterprise which is competitive with the business in which the corporation is engaged .... [The
directors and officers] should terminate their position/status ... when they first make arrange-
ments.., to compete .... " IM at 483.
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tempts to persuade key employees to join competing ventures. In one
example, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that an em-
ployee's solicitation of key managers breached the fiduciary duty of
loyalty because it left the employer with inadequate personnel.84
Other courts, however, indicate that extensive notification of fellow
employees does not violate fiduciary obligations. In McCallister, the
defendant responded to inquiries by fellow employees about possible
employment by stating that they could join the company once it "got
up and running."85 The court found no breach of the duty of loyalty.8 6
Ellis & Marshall Associates and Dwyer both held that a departing
fiduciary can make an offer to an at-will employee.87 In Ellis &
Marshall, the court found no breach of the duty of loyalty even though
the evidence revealed that the defendant had approached at least two
fellow employees prior to the termination of employment.
These conflicting decisions are explainable in part on the basis
of the particular employee being solicited and the relevant harm to
the company. Courts have been willing to allow solicitation of at-will
employees if such solicitation presents little harm to the employer. 89
84. See Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 415, 420 (Mass. 1991). While still general
manager, the defendant in this case convinced the vice-president for marketing, the new
product design manager, the employer's most experienced engineer in technology, the
manufacturing manager, and the engineering manager to leave the employer. See id. at 419;
see also American Republic Ins. Co. v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir.
1972) (holding that hiring other employees of defendant's employer while still employed
constituted unfair competition); E.D. Lacey Mills, Inc. v. Keith, 359 S.E.2d 148, 155 (Ga. App.
1987) (finding that broaching the subject of plans to form rival enterprise to employer's sales
representatives raised an issue of material fact as to breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty); Radiae
Abrasives, Inc. v. Diamond Tech., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 428, 431 (11. App. Ct. 1988) (finding breach of
duty of loyalty by employee in contracting with fellow employees of employer while still
employed); Unichem Corp. v. Gurtler, 498 N.E.2d 724, 728 (ll. App. Ct. 1986) (finding breach of
officer's duty of loyalty to solicit an employee to leave the employer and join a rival business in
which the officer planned to join in near future).
85. McCallister Co. v. Kastella, 825 P.2d 980,983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
86. See iaL at 985.
87. Ellis & Marshall Assocs. v. Marshall, 306 N.E.2d 712, 714-15 (1l. App. Ct. 1973)
(finding no breach of duty of loyalty when fellow employees of defendant joined competing
enterprise); Dwyer, Costello & Knox, P.C. v. Diak, 846 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)
(same).
88. Ellis & Marshall, 306 N.E.2d at 714-15. Although a factual dispute existed over the
exact date at which the defendant terminated his employment, even under the defendant's
testimony these employees were approached prior to resigning.
89. See, e.g., Buick-Nissan v. Michael Oldsmobile, 539 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357-58 (Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 1989) (holding that defendant had not breached fiduciary duties by inducing an at-will
employee to join a competitive enterprise because no evidence indicated an intention to cause
serious harm to the employer by raiding its employees). The justification for this rule comes
from language in Comment e to the Restatement of Agency, which finds liability if an employee
"causes fellow employees to break their contracts with the employer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 393 cmt.e. (1958). But see Jet Courier Serv. Inc. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486 (Colo.
1989). In Jet Courier, the court held that the employment relationship is only one factor for
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Moreover, the Restatement allows employees to depart together and
join a competing business, unless key employees agree to leave
together, thus hindering the employer's ability to continue
operations.9° Decisions based on an ex post analysis of whether the
activity harmed the employer, however, provide little guidance for the
employee planning to establish his or her own business, for in most
cases it will be difficult to predict the impact of taking a few
employees. Such a rule also fails to comport with notions of
competition. As some decisions recognize, the mere attempt to
persuade another employee to join a new enterprise effectively places
the departing employee in direct competition with the employer.91
IV. THE PRELIMIARY STEPS DOCTRINE CANNOT PROTECT
CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
Besides the inability of the current preliminary steps standard
to render consistent results, the doctrine also has failed to balance
competing policy interests of fairness to the company and the promo-
tion of free competition. The fine line between notification and solici-
tation applied by courts adopting a narrow view of competitive behav-
ior has allowed employees to steal customers and fellow employees.
Meanwhile, the absence of a clear rule and the tendency of some
courts to find almost all preliminary steps wrongful has limited the
amount of preparation allowed and stifled the policy goal of promoting
free competition.
A. The Corporate Interest
The extensive preparation allowed by some courts enables
employees to circumvent fiduciary obligations that protect the em-
ployer from exploitative behavior.9 2  As McCallister and Ellis &
courts to consider when determining if the fiduciary's attempts to solicit fellow at-will employ-
ees constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty. Id. at 496. The court explained that the
employee's duty of loyalty was not limited to the duty to refrain from tortious interference with
contractual relations between the employer and employees, and that the court should consider
other factors such as the impact or potential impact of the employee's actions on the employer's
operations and the extent of any promises or inducements made to the employees. See id. at
496-97.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 393 cmt.e (1958).
91. See, e.g., E.D. Lacey Mills, Inc. v. Keith, 359 S.E.2d 148, 155 (Ga. App. 1987);
Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (Md. 1978).
92. See the duty of loyalty discussion supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text. See also
Schaller, supra note 12, at 71-74 (discussing courts' different justifications for the preliminary
steps doctrine).
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Marshall Associates demonstrate, fiduciaries may secretly contact
clients and fellow employees and suggest they transfer their business
to the new firm. With the aid of an attorney, departing employees can
tailor their actions to keep them within the boundaries of mere
preparation. Thus, in the event they are discovered, they can argue
that their pre-termination activity was only preliminary.9 3 Moreover,
under this rule employers have a high evidentiary burden. To prove
liability, employers will have to incur extensive discovery expenses to
show that significant efforts of persuasion were used by the departing
employee.9 Given the number of duty of loyalty suits filed each year,
businesses must incur very high costs in proving liability.
95
Courts adopting a narrow interpretation of competitive behav-
ior fail to recognize the vulnerability of the corporation. Employees
have personal contact with the customers, and the customers associ-
ate the product with the employee who serves them, especially in
service industries.9 Thus, when the employee starts her own busi-
ness, the client will often transfer her account in order to prevent any
disruption in services. The corporation is frequently left in economic
turmoil.97  The relationship between employees poses similar prob-
93. Many cases reveal the extensive secretive activity that fiduciaries can claim is mere
preparation under the current standard. See, e.g., McCallister Co. v. Kastella, 825 P.2d 980,
981, 985 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that letter sent by departing employee was mere
notification, because the letter so stated). Mercer Management Consulting, Inc. v. Wilde, 920 F.
Supp. 219, 235 (D.D.C. 1996), provides a good example of how departing employees can tailor
their competitive, bad-faith behavior as mere preparation. In Mercer, high-level management
consultants were able to notify key clients of their plans to form their consulting business and
send diskettes with all the clients' work on it, thus increasing the likelihood that the clients
would switch businesses. Id. Sending the diskettes eliminated the clients' fear that past work
would be lost. Conveniently sending these diskettes, when coupled with the notification,
certainly suggests solicitive behavior.
94. See Schaller, supra note 12, at 71 (explaining that the preliminary steps rule tempts
employees to engage in "carefully conceived and precisely executed schemes" that employers can
catch only with time-consuming and costly investigation).
95. Over 70 reported cases have resolved duty of loyalty disputes in the last two years, but
the prevalence of breaches of duty of loyalty is probably much higher. The discovery expenses
in an intensely factual situation probably deter many corporations from bringing claims at all.
In fact, most litigated cases involve situations in which a significant number of clients or
employees switched to the new enterprise. The cases discussed in Part I provide a sampling of
this problem. See Gelb, supra note 7, at 893 (discussing the high costs of employee disloyalty
and fraud to businesses each year).
96. See Walter E. Zemitsch, Inc. v. Harrison, 712 S.W.2d 418, 421-22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)
(stating that "in the sales industry the goodwill of a customer frequently attaches to the em-
ployer's sales representative personally; the employer's product becomes associated in the
customer's mind with that representative") (quoting Continental Research Corp. v. Scholz, 595
S.W.2d 396,401 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
97. See, e.g., McCallister, 825 P.2d at 983 (finding that four of the employer's six or seven
clients left and contracted with the defendants new business). For instance, in Fish v. Adams,
401 So. 2d 843, 844-45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), an employee opened up a beauty shop down
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lems. The strong personal ties that develop put departing employees
in a position to influence the decisions of co-workers.98 Often, a key
employee notifies fellow workers of her plans, causing several to
follow to the new enterprise. 99 Again, the company is left in dire eco-
nomic straits.
The consequences of extensive preliminary steps can be devas-
tating for the company and the economy as a whole. As courts become
less inclined to use fiduciary obligations to protect the company, em-
ployees are more likely to act in their own self-interest. Businesses
will have to spend even more time monitoring employee behavior, or
will have to contract with key employees to protect thenselves. 1°°
Regardless of the path chosen, business expenses will increase, caus-
ing profits to decline.
B. The Individual Interest
Despite the confusion of the preliminary steps doctrine and its
inability to protect the corporation, some preparation must be al-
lowed.10 As Maryland Metals has pointed out, free competition is an
essential component of our economy. 1 2 Without allowing some prepa-
ration, the restraint placed on fiduciaries by duty of loyalty principles
may actually decrease the number of opportunities that are tapped,
for competitive enterprises are frequently built on corporate opportu-
nities.1 3 As one commentator has argued, individual fiduciaries have
a better chance to exploit the opportunity than the corporation in
some instances, 1 4 especially if the opportunity deals with a product or
market innovation. Bringing an innovation from the market stage to
the street from the employer. All five of the beauticians began working for the new shop as soon
as it opened, and many clients also switched. The employer was out of business in four months
See id.
98. See Terry A. O'Neill, Employees' Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency
Debate, 25 CONN. L. REV. 681, 701 (1993) ("Employees often develop strong personal relation-
ships with each other... and they are therefore in a position to influence the decisions of those
co-workers and customers.").
99. See, e.g., Vigoro Indus. v. Cleveland Chem. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1150, 1169 (E.D. Ark.
1994) (stating that the plaintiffs employees left with the departing defendant-employee because
of their trust and loyalty to him).
100. See, e.g., ONeill, supra note 98, at 699 (explaining how restrictive covenants provide
employers with greater protection than employees' common-law fiduciary duties).
10L But see Schaller, supra note 12, at 71-75 (arguing for the elimination of the prelimi-
nary steps doctrine).
102. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 382 A.2d 564,568-69 (Md. 1978).
103. Fiduciaries are usually the highly talented and well-paid employees who have the
client contact and finances to begin the new venture. See Competing Interests, supra note 3, at




successful commercialization is a long and risky process, and evidence
indicates that smaller, more flexible operations can manage the
process more effectively than a structured company.1°5
Prohibiting preliminary arrangements also raises fairness
concerns because the rule places employees trying to start their own
business at a competitive disadvantage. Most entrepreneurs have the
ability to contact key players and even attempt to solicit their busi-
ness before investing substantial funds into the venture. These en-
trepreneurs already have some idea of how successful their product
may be. But an employee considering a new venture that competes
with her employer cannot effectively research the market until after
resigning. Studies show that successful ventures require extensive
background research, which includes contact with key customers in
the industry.06
Furthermore, employers will have the upper hand in retaining
their clients. Since employees usually must provide notice of resigna-
tion and an explanation for leaving, corporations will have several
weeks to prepare for the competition. While the departing employee's
hands remain tied, the employer can negotiate with clients to ensure
they remain with the employer. Thus, eliminating all pre-termination
negotiations increases the difficulty for the departing employee to
achieve success in his or her new venture. Given the inherent risks in
starting an enterprise, this additional burden will likely deter some
employees from starting their own venture.
A strict duty of loyalty that prohibits all competitive planning,
moreover, does not comport with the intentions of the contracting
parties. In the absence of a covenant-not-to-compete, fiduciaries be-
lieve they retain the privilege to compete with the company in the
future and to prepare to compete while still with the corporation.10 7
Prohibiting all preparation and requiring a rigid standard of undi-
vided loyalty does not comport with employee beliefs in freedom of
economic mobility.108 Officers and directors are not expected to put
105. Pat Chew has pointed out, following many of the ideas of Peter Drucker, that new
innovations disrupt the corporate bureaucracy and its procedure and policies. See id at 453.
The extra cost, which will be incurred by the corporation should it pursue the innovation, often
prevents it from so doing. In other words, pursuing the new product is not financially prudent.
see id.
106. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
107. See Competing Interests, supra note 3, at 448-49 (discussing the positions of corpora-
tions and fiduciaries).
108. See, e.g., Baker v. Battershell, Madison Equity No. 5, 1986 WL 7602, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1986) (suggesting employees' freedom of mobility should be considered); Crane Co. v.
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forth all of their time, energies, efforts, and cumulative talents into
the company; they are expected to perform all the job functions for
which they contracted.10 9  Furthermore, as a practical matter,
fiduciaries often discuss ideas with employees, customers, friends,
and colleagues. Getting some feedback from such individuals before a
career-changing step is made is both smart and natural. Thus, inter-
preting competitive behavior to preclude virtually any pre-termina-
tion negotiations does not conform with either employee expectations
or the realities of the business world.
Even more troubling, a stringent duty of loyalty does not con-
sider variations in the employment relationship. As some courts have
pointed out, expectations of loyalty differ greatly depending upon the
employee's status as an inside or outside director, mid-level manager,
corporate executive, or typical employee.110 The vulnerability of the
employee also differs, particularly between at-will and fixed-term
employees. Since courts developed the preliminary steps doctrine in
part to help employees prepare for the vagaries of the job market, the
doctrine should not restrain employee mobility without considering
employee vulnerability."' By not considering the employee's status in
determining the amount of preparation allowed, courts do not con-
sider the employee's interests.
The main problem with the current standard is the inability of
courts to provide a consistent, predictable rule. Fiduciaries seeking to
start their own enterprise are unable to determine what steps they
may take, and attorneys are often unable to provide proper advice."
2
In many preliminary steps cases, the fiduciary found in breach had
acted after consulting with an attorney. 3 The practical effect of this
Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872-73 (Utah 1978) ("[llndividual liberty includes the right to advise
customers of the fact that he is going to quit.").
109. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 222 N.W.2d 71, 77 (Minn. 1974) (indicating that best efforts
does not require employees to "devote their time exclusively to the corporation); Durwood v.
Dubinsky, 361 S.W.2d 779, 789-90 (Mo. 1962) ("Of course, the requirement to devote one's entire
time is subject to a reasonable construction.....).
110. See, e.g., Vigoro Indus. v. Cleveland Chem. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1150, 1160 (E.D. Ark.
1994) (stating a reluctance to put any restraint on at-will employees); Veco Corp. v. Babcock,
611 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (Il. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that corporate officers stand on different
footing than typical employees due to fiduciary obligations).
111. See Meyers v. Roger J. Sullivan Co., 131 N.W. 521, 523 (Mich. 1911) ("One is entitled
to seek other employment before he is on the street.").
112. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Radiac Abrasives, Inc. v. Diamond Tech. Inc., 532 N.E.2d 428, 429 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988) (stating that individual defendants admitted at deposition that they decided to begin
preliminary steps only after discussing their proposed conduct with corporate counsel);
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., 807 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Ky. 1991) (stating that defendant
received advice of counsel while formulating a plan to start his own business during his em-
ployment with the plaintiff).
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confusing standard is to deter some fiduciaries planning to compete
from making any preparation. Under the present rule, only risk-tak-
ers will put forth any preparation before resigning.
V. SOLUTION-CONSIDERING EMPLOYEE STATUS AND EXPECTATIONS
Courts can satisfy the various policy interests and achieve
more predictability by recognizing that the employer-employee rela-
tionship is essentially contractual, and that loyalty can be viewed as
an implied contractual term that varies based on the employment
relationship. From this standpoint, the restraint loyalty places on the
employee's right to prepare to compete should differ significantly be-
tween fixed-term and at-will employees. Since no security exists in
the at-will relationship, these employees both need and expect the
right to make extensive preparations. Empirical evidence from the
business world supports this point and suggests that even employers
believe at-will employees have the right to prepare for the future." 4
Conversely, the security of a fixed-term relationship justifies a more
stringent standard, perhaps prohibiting any preparation.
A The Duty of Loyalty as an Implied Contractual Term
1. The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine Reflects a
Contractual View of Loyalty
Although scholars continue to debate the issue, corporate law
fiduciary duties perhaps can be best understood from a contractual,
hypothetical-bargain viewpoint."5 Assuming this premise, the fiduci-
114. See infra Part V.B.
115. The debate focuses on whether fiduciary duties should be understood in contract or in
trust. Fischel and Easterbrook are the main proponents of the contract viewpoint. They argue
that fiduciary duty is a response to the impossibility of writing contracts that completely cover
all the parties' obligations, and, therefore, duties of loyalty should be determined based on the
terms for which the parties would have bargained assuming low transaction costs. See Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425 (1993);
see also Competing Interests, supra note 3, at 439 (suggesting that officers and directors should
make explicit contracts with the corporation prior to employment, but in the absence of such
agreements courts should examine the reasonable expectations of the parties to the agreement);
Richard Epstein, Contract and Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate Opportunity, 21
DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 24 (1996) (arguing that the corporate opportunity doctrine is not based on
non-waivable trust principles but should be viewed ex ante).
Victor Brudney and Deborah DeMott, among others, oppose the contract view. See Victor
Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 601-07 (1997);
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ary duty of loyalty could be viewed as a gap-filler to an indefinite
contract, a material term that the court could interpret based on its
belief of what reasonable parties would have agreed to had they con-
sidered the issue prior to employment. 116 Applying this approach to
preliminary steps issues suggests that the restraint loyalty places on
the right to make preparations should be determined by what the
employer and employee would have agreed upon if they had discussed
the issue. This "hypothetical bargain" view receives support from a
few duty of loyalty cases, defenses in the corporate opportunity
doctrine, and changes in the business world.
Some corporate opportunity cases explicitly consider the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties when determining whether the
taking of the opportunity breached the duty of loyalty. The well-
known case of Burg v. Horn illustrates this tendency. 117 In Burg, the
defendants wholly owned a few ventures that bought and sold real
estate. Because of their success, they decided to convince the plain-
tiffs, who were close friends of the defendants, to join them in forming
the Darand corporation."1 The plaintiffs agreed, and over a period of
several years the defendants acquired nine properties individually or
through wholly-owned corporations. The defendants never offered the
business opportunities to the Darand company, and the plaintiffs
brought suit claiming the defendants had breached fiduciary obliga-
tions by taking corporate opportunities in the line of business of the
Darand company."9 The court found for the defendants, holding that
the Darand Company did not have an interest or expectancy in the
properties. 120
The court reasoned that in determining a breach it must in
each case consider the relationship between the fiduciary and the
corporation. From this relationship, the court should then determine
whether a duty to offer the opportunity should be implied.121 In short,
it suggested that whether loyalty constrained the directors from pur-
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J.
879, 882. They argue that fiduciary duties are grounded in trust and agency. These obligations
require self-denying behavior by the fiduciary that go beyond fairness and honesty. The fiduci-
ary must place the corporation first, a premise that a contractual viewpoint cannot account for.
116. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 115, at 427 (suggesting that duty of loyalty
should be seen as an implied term based on what parties would have agreed upon); See gener-
ally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 53-55, 62-64 (4th ed.
1998) (providing background information on implied, material terms).
117. Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967).
118. See id. at 898.
119. See id. at 899.




suing the opportunities individually depended upon the expectations
of the parties. The court found no interest or expectancy requiring
the defendants to offer the opportunity to the Darand company be-
cause the parties could have reasonably expected the opportunities to
belong to the defendants' other businesses, since the defendants spent
most of their time with those enterprises.12 The court noted that the
situation might be different if the defendants had been full-time em-
ployees of the Darand company.'
Common defenses to breach of loyalty claims further support a
contractual view of loyalty in corporate opportunity cases. For in-
stance, the fiduciary can defend a claim of usurpation of an opportu-
nity by showing that the opportunity was offered to the fiduciary in a
private, rather than a corporate, capacity. If so, the taking of the op-
portunity by the fiduciary does not breach the duty of loyalty even
though the opportunity was in the same line of business as the
corporation."A The results in these cases effectuate an ex ante view of
what the parties would have agreed to had they bargained over the
opportunity prior to the signing of the employment agreement. A
reasonable outside director, for example, would not give up all
interests upon agreeing to work for the company, nor would the
company expect the director to do so. Many outside directors have
significant interests in the same industry.'2 Indeed, the company
employs them on the basis of this expertise. By assuming positions as
fiduciaries, moreover, officers and directors have not relinquished all
rights to pursue personal opportunities made available to them. Such
a rule would amount to corporate slavery, considerably increasing the




124. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, § 5.05(b)(1XA) (stating that
the opportunity must come to the officer or senior executive in a corporate capacity). Science
Accessories Corp. v. Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 964 (Del. 1980), provides an example
of unwillingness by courts to find liability for opportunities offered to employees in a private
capacity. The defendants in Summagraphics helped develop and market a new product that
was designed primarily by a friend, in direct competition with the employer. Id. at 960. The
employer brought an action against the defendants claiming the new product represented a
business opportunity which defendants were obligated to offer to their employer. See id. at 961.
The court found the product was an outside opportunity not available to the employer, so
defendants had no obligation to disclose the concept to their employer and receive approval
before acquiring it for personal gain. See id at 964.
125. Outside directors are often accountants, attorneys, educators, consultants, or officers
in other corporations. See DmcToRS', supra note 21, at 16.
126. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that a trust view of the duty of loyalty would increase
the costs of contracting for these agents. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 115, at 427. As
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Officers and directors can also take business opportunities if,
after full disclosure, the board of directors of the corporation
consents.127 This consent can be viewed as an agreement to relax the
duty of loyalty with respect to that particular economic opportunity,
since without consent the taking of the opportunity by the fiduciary
would constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty. This exception
further demonstrates the contractual foundation of the doctrine,
suggesting that the duty of loyalty can be relaxed if the parties agree
to do so. Recent corporate opportunity cases have taken this defense
further, holding that fiduciaries can defeat a breach of loyalty claim
by proving that the corporation would have rejected the opportunity if
it was offered.128 Although these cases do not use the term
"reasonable expectations," implicitly they view loyalty as an implied
term by allowing the defendant to show the taking of the opportunity
was fair and not harmful to the corporation.129 This more flexible
approach to the corporate opportunity doctrine suggests that the duty
of loyalty requires something less than utmost loyalty.130
2. Current Business Realities Support the Premise
that Loyalty is Best Understood as an
Implied Contractual Term
At a practical level, changes in the economy and workplace
support the assumption that loyalty can, and perhaps should, be
viewed from a contractual perspective. With officers and directors
increasingly switching jobs and frequently engaging in many different
enterprises simultaneously, it is unrealistic to maintain a trust view
of loyalty.'3' Because of the threat of layoffs, employees cannot give
they put it, [a]cting on moral belief that agents ought to be selfless will not make principals
better off; it will instead lead to fewer agents, or higher costs of hiring agents." I&r
127. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GoVERNANcE § 8.31, at 481-85 (1993) (defining
disclosure as a defense to a charge of usurpation of a business opportunity).
128. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Avery, 703 A.2d 117, 127-28 (Conn. 1997) (stating that even in
the absence of disclosure, the fiduciary may prevail if able to show that the taking of the oppor-
tunity did not harm the corporation because the corporation would not have pursued the
opportunity if it was offered); Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys. Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 156-57 (Del. 1996)
(holding that the director did not have to offer the opportunity to the corporation when the
corporation lacked capacity or interest in the opportunity); Epstein, supra note 115, at 21-25
(analyzing Broz and stating that if the employer is not in the specific business in which the
employee pursues an opportunity, there should be no breach of the duty of loyalty).
129. See Ostrowski, 703 A.2d at 127-28.
130. The approach is more flexible in comparison to ALI's Principles of Corporate
Governance, which makes disclosure mandatory before an opportunity can be taken by a
fiduciary. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, § 5.05(aXl).
131. See generally John Burgess, Managers Forge New Employee Relations; Fear of Layoffs,
Pressures of'80s Alter Concept of Loyalty to Firms, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1988, at H1 ("American
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their utmost loyalty to any one corporation. More importantly,
however, a contractual vision of loyalty allows the courts to vary the
obligation based on employee status. Holding a high-level officer with
high compensation and access to significant confidential information
to a duty of utmost loyalty is very different from holding a typical
employee to the same standard. The perspectives of the high-level
and low-level employees are significantly different.8 2 Analyzing the
employment relationship from an ex ante contractual viewpoint allows
the court the flexibility to make these distinctions.
B. Courts Should Distinguish Between At-Will
and Fixed-Term Employees
The reasonable expectations of an employee or employer con-
cerning the right to make extensive preparations will depend on
whether the employment is at will or for a fixed term. Studies have
shown that the employee's expectation of loyalty directly relates to job
security.'" The increased security associated with a fixed-term em-
ployment agreement, therefore, suggests that greater employee
loyalty should be expected. Indeed, from an ex ante position, the
employer would provide guarantees of employment-that is,
guarantees to fire only for cause-only in exchange for limitations on
employee freedom.1' 4 A reasonable employer presumably would not
companies in the 1980s have become more willing to throw employees overboard on short
notice... [and] ever-bigger paychecks are making employees more willing to jump on their own
when a better offer comes along."). One commentator quoted a young manager who stated:
I want to feel that the company is loyal to me and I do, to some degree, but I also know
intellectually that they will only remain loyal for as long as they need me. When it
comes time for them to make a choice, if there is someone better, rm out and they are
in.
CHARLES HECKScHER, WHITE COLLAR BLUES: MANAGEMENT LOYALTIES IN AN AGE OF CORPORATE
RSTRUCTURING 35 (1995).
132. Some courts have recognized the need for a more stringent duty of loyalty when a
traditional fiduciary (e.g., officer, director, or high-level employee) is involved. See supra notes
65-73 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Denise M. Rousseau, New Hire Perceptions of Their Own and Their
Employer's Obligations: A Study of Psychological Contracts, 11 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 389,
395 (1990) (noting that study of graduating business students entering their first full-time job
indicated a strong relationship between loyalty and job security); James Traub, Loyalty: A
Spasm of Layoffs and Downsizing in the 1980s Obliterated What Was Left of Corporate Loyalty,
Bus. MONTH, Oct. 1, 1990, at 85-87 (noting that employees realize that jobs and employment
relationships are not as assured or stable as they used to be).
134. As one commentator has suggested, "[firms benefit from fewer obligations to employ-
ees because it frees them to respond more nimbly to market changes." Paul M. Krawzak,
Trends Suggest Days of Lifelong Job Over: More Temporary Jobs, Training Cuts and
Downsizing Among Changes in the Workplace, PEORIA J. STAR, March 24, 1997, at Al; see
generally PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK (Oxford University Press 1997) (arguing
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limit his or her freedom to lay off employees without protecting the
company from exploitation by departing employees. Similarly, the
employee would only accept a fixed-term agreement if he or she had
no better prospective employment interests. Thus, in the fixed-term
relationship, imposing a more stringent loyalty requirement comports
with the agreement the parties would have arrived at if they had
bargained over the terms.
Similar reasoning suggests that the at-will employee should be
subject to a relaxed duty of loyalty in the making of preparations to
compete. Implicit within the at-will agreement is the right of either
party to terminate the relationship any time with or without cause.
The employer has no obligation to provide job security, and the em-
ployee has no responsibility to stay with the employer should a better
job arise.1 5 The employment at-will relationship has been character-
ized by some courts and commentators as a day-to-day agreement
with the employee providing labor in exchange for wages, and with
neither party having a view toward a future commitment to the
other.18 6 This relationship leaves little room for a restraint on mobil-
ity. Without job security, the at-will employee must constantly seek
other job opportunities, both to maximize wages earned and to protect
from layoff. Preparation and contact with outside parties, therefore,
is of extreme importance to the at-will employee, especially
considering the importance of client contact to the establishment of
business ventures. 137 From an ex ante position, an at-will employee
that there is no longer an unspoken understanding 'that companies provide job security,
training, and career development in exchange for hard work and loyalty).
135. The at-will relationship exists whenever the employee fails to receive assurances of
termination only for cause, either verbally or in the employment contract or employee manual.
Courts have provided a limited number of exceptions to the at-will relationship. These include
the implied contract exception where statements or conduct by the employer imply some form of
job security, and the public policy exception (which has been narrowly construed by the courts).
Under the public policy exception, the discharge must implicate a strong, usually statute-based,
public interest. A few courts have implied a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. For an
overview of the legal implications of employment at-will, see DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND POLICY, 50-105 (3d ed. 1992); Peter Stone Partee,
Note, Reversing the Presumption of Employment At Will, 44 VAND. L. REV. 689 (1991).
136. As one commentator has explained, the traditional view of the indefinite labor
relationship is that the employer makes a unilateral offer of wages in exchange for the
employee's labor, but with either party being able to withdraw from the relationship at any
time. Thus on this basis, each day is a new contract on these terms, with no view for the future
established. See Howard C. Ellis, Employment-At-Will and Contract Principles: The Paradigm
of Pennsylvania, 96 DICK. L. REV. 595, 613 (1992).
137. Many business and marketing studies have shown the importance of extensive back-
ground research before the new venture is formed. Background research generally entails
contact and negotiations with key customers in the industry. See generally CLARI, supra note 5,
at 37-44 (discussing several methods of market research to complete a market analysis); Cadotte
& Woodruff, supra note 5, at 115-29 (describing the research process to evaluate a market
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would only sacrifice the right to make preliminary arrangements if
promised job security at a desired wage. 13s The employer should
likewise expect less loyalty from the at-will employee given the
employer's ability to terminate the relationship at any time.
Empirical evidence from the business world supports the view
that at-will employees expect and need the right to prepare 3 9
Changes in the economy and workplace have significantly altered the
employment relationship. The prevalence of at-will status in almost
all employment positions, one that employers make clearly known to
employees to avoid wrongful discharge suits, 40 and the numerous
layoffs and downsizing that occurred in the late 1980s and early
1990s have forever destroyed traditional notions of loyalty.'4 ' The
days of employer paternalism and utmost employee loyalty are gone.
The employer no longer provides job security and the employee no
longer expects it. A new professional employee outlook has developed,
one with a commitment to career rather than to an organization. One
scholar has dubbed this the emergence of the "protean manager," the
opportunity); Cooper & Kleinschmidt, supra note 6, at 1-14 (discussing factors, particularly pre-
development activities, in the success of new products); Lauglaug, supra note 5, at 15-23
(discussing a new approach to the "collection, analysis and translation of customer needs, wants,
and expectations").
138. This view is based on Roussean's argument that loyalty and security are reciprocal
obligations in the minds of most employees. See Rousseau, supra note 133, at 389-400.
139. See id.
140. Most companies include prominently displayed at-will employment policy statements,
and employers usually reiterate the at-will relationship and have employees sign acknowledg-
ments of their status. As one attorney has pointed out, in employment handbooks and company
policies towards employees "[trhe parties both know in advance that [the employee] can be
dismissed at any time, and that [the employee's] obligations are essentially to perform a gen-
erally understood task but with no specific future goals." See 213 PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
5013-18 (BNA Policy and Practice Series 1997) (quoting Stanley H. Lieberstein, WHO OWNS
WHAT IS IN YOUR HEAD? (1979)).
141. Since 1987, over seven million Americans have lost their jobs. See Denise M.
Rousseau, Organizational Behavior in the New Organizational Era, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 515,
518 (1997) (discussing mobility due to job loss and varied employment relationships across
industries and firms). Numerous articles and books have been written on the decline in loyalty
in the modern workplace. See generally HECKSCHER, supra note 131, at 6-9, 35 (suggesting that
corporations are no longer "offering protection and security in exchange for undivided loyalty");
Jeff Anderson, How Do Companies Foster Employee Loyalty?, CAP. DISTRICT Bus. REV., June 17,
1996, at *1-2 ('The organizational landscape is changing as we speak, and the notion of cradle-
to-grave employment is no longer true. Employers are now saying: 'You could be a great
performer but if we don't need your skills any more, we can't afford to keep you around.'")
(quoting Professor Richard Leifer); John Burgess, supra note 131, at H1 (describing the changed
outlook of employees and companies toward loyalty and security); Linda K. Stroh & Anne H.
Reilly, Loyalty in the Age of Downsizing, 38 SLOAN MGMr. RZv., Summer 1997, at 83 (indicating
that the loyalty in both employers and employees is declining-making money is number one for
the employer, and employees show less loyalty after the numerous changes in company
structure).
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self-directed manager who is willing to change to fulfill personal
goals.142
The changes in the employment relationship and the differing
expectations of employees suggest that the law should relax the duty
of loyalty for at-will employees in preliminary steps situations. This
relaxed duty of loyalty should allow the at-will employee significant
leeway to make preparations, including client and employee contact. 143
Courts have stated a reluctance to inhibit the mobility of at-will em-
ployees as opposed to traditional fiduciaries.'" Courts should act on
this inclination by considering the fundamental differences between
at-will and fixed-term employees when determining whether an em-
ployee's activities were disloyal.
C. Distinguishing Between At-Will and Fixed-Term
Employees Will Provide Consistent Results
and Protect Policy Interests
Relaxing the duty of loyalty for at-will employees yields consis-
tent results while protecting the policy interests behind the prelimi-
nary steps doctrine. Individual interests are protected because at-will
employees are provided leeway to make extensive preparations, in-
cluding negotiating with clients and employees about employment
possibilities. The ability to make extensive preparations eliminates
the at-will employee's vulnerability. The departing employee can
fully ascertain the risks and possibilities of opportunities before
incurring a significant financial investment. The ability to plan
thoroughly will increase the likelihood that the employee will be
willing to start a new venture based on an innovative idea, furthering
society's interest in free competition. Finally, this approach gives
employees the means to maintain the freedom of mobility. Employees
can retain the right to pursue future opportunities by refusing to sign
fixed-term agreements.
142. DOUGLAS T. HALL ET AL., CAREER DEVELOPMENT iN ORGANIZATIONS (1986), quoted in
Stroh & Reilly, supra note 141, at 84.
143. This Note advocates a relaxed duty of loyalty from a right-to-prepare vantage point
only. By no means does this Note advocate a relaxed duty of loyalty in regards to the stealing of
trade secrets or confidential information. Again, from a hypothetical bargain approach, employ-
ers would demand loyalty in this regard whether the employment relationship is fixed-term or
at-will.
144. See, e.g., Vigoro Indus. v. Cleveland Chem. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1150, 1160 (E.D. Ark.
1994); In re Golden Distrib., Ltd. v. Auburn Merchandising Distributorship, Inc., 134 B.R. 750,
756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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Consideration of the employment relationship also allows
courts to impose tighter restraints on key employees while providing
more leeway for typical employees. Most employees are at-will, and
those with fixed-term agreements or any kind of job security are
usually the highly talented directors and officers who are best able to
bargain for this security.145 These high-level officers and directors
have access to the most confidential information and the greatest
influence on key customers. Thus, their disloyalty poses the greatest
threat to their employers. Imposing a more stringent duty of loyalty
on these employees is a logical approach.
Employers could likewise protect themselves under this rule.
First, the employer would be on notice that at-will employees would
be subject to relaxed fiduciary obligations. The employer, therefore,
could buy additional protection by bargaining for a fixed-term
contract. The employer could also bargain for a covenant-not-to-com-
pete to further protect itself from employees stealing clients. The
increased use of these covenants suggests that this is a viable option,
and employers should be required to pay for it rather than simply
relying on the duty of loyalty to stifle competition. 46 The covenant or
fixed-term approach would be particularly useful in protecting the
closely-held corporation, where virtually all employees are vital to the
business and have significant client contact. 147 This approach would
also allow courts to apply a more stringent duty of loyalty when
preparation is made by a fixed-term employee.
The distinction between at-will and fixed-term employees,
moreover, would eliminate the confusion in preliminary steps cases.
It would allow the at-will employee extensive preparation, including
contact with customers and fellow employees, while still prohibiting
the taking of trade secrets or other confidential information. High-
145. The employer will retain the right to fire at will unless the employee has enough
talent and skill to bargain for more security. Those able to do so will only be high-level employ-
ees. Interview with Donald Langevoort, Professor, Vanderbilt Law School, in Nashville, Tenn.
(Feb. 1, 1998).
146. A covenant-not-to-compete provides only limited protection, however, given the
increasing willingness of the courts to find them in violation of public policy. It is also limited in
geographic scope and therefore would not satisfy all disloyalty concerns.
147. Most preliminary steps problems occur in the closely-held corporation setting. This
makes sense for a number of reasons: in closely-held corporations virtually all employees are
key employees with confidential information and client access; smaller enterprises are more
vulnerable to the loss of key clients and therefore have greater incentive to bring suit if clients
or employees are stolen; finally, clients are more willing to leave in the closely-held corporation
setting, probably because in this setting clients tend to associate products with the employees
who provide services rather than with the corporation as a whole. See generally Schaller, supra
note 12 (summarizing disloyalty cases in Illinois).
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ranking officers, meanwhile, would be subject to a corporate opportu-
nity analysis which would effectively eliminate pre-termination con-
tact or solicitation with clients or fellow employees. An intensive
factual inquiry would still be necessary, but instead of using a vague
competition standard to determine whether the employee's behavior
breached the duty of loyalty, courts would simply consider the em-
ployment relationship and either relax the restraint of loyalty or
apply the more stringent corporate opportunity doctrine. This consis-
tent and clear rule would deter litigation, because attorneys would be
able to provide proper advice and employers would have a better
notion of when a valid claim exists.
VI. CONCLUSION
The preliminary steps doctrine poses significant problems for
attorneys advising clients and for judges deciding cases. While most
jurisdictions have accepted the preliminary steps rule, courts have
inconsistently applied the standard to cases involving pre-termination
negotiations with customers and employees. Some courts have
adopted a narrow view of competitive behavior, allowing employees
extensive pre-termination contact. These courts suggest that prepa-
ration becomes actual competition only when customers guarantee
future contracts. Other courts have provided a much broader view,
finding that almost any pre-termination negotiations with clients
constitutes wrongful solicitation. At least one jurisdiction appears to
have prohibited any preparation. Courts also struggle to consistently
define what contact with employees is allowed within the right to
prepare. A few courts allow some leeway when dealing with at-will
employees and when little harm to the company occurs. Other courts
deny any right to such negotiations.
Jurisdictions that provide significant leeway for preparation
ignore the vulnerability of the corporation. Courts that prohibit al-
most all client contact, on the other hand, overlook both the impor-
tance of pre-termination negotiations for employees planning a new
venture and the vulnerability of the at-will employee.
An approach that varies the duty of loyalty based on the em-
ployment relationship can satisfy many of the current dilemmas in
the preliminary steps doctrine. Both scholars and courts have charac-
terized the duty of loyalty as an implied term based on the reasonable
expectations of the parties to the agreement. Courts should follow
this conception of the duty of loyalty and realize that expectations
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differ significantly between fixed-term and at-will employees. By
providing more leeway for at-will employees, but applying the duty of
loyalty stringently to fixed-term employees, courts can balance the
needs of free competition and fairness to the company while
establishing a more consistent rule.
Scott W. Fielding*
* Special thanks to Jeffery Mayfield, whose numerous dinner conversations on this topic
will not be forgotten, and to Professor Donald Langevoort, Lawrence Fielding, and Jeff Sauer for
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